We investigate whether laws restricting fiscal policies across U.S. states lead politicians to adopt more partisan regulatory policy instead. We first show that partisan policy outcomes do exist across U.S. states, with Republicans cutting taxes and spending and Democrats raising them. We then demonstrate that these partisan policy outcomes are moderated in states with no-carry restrictions on public deficits. Lastly, we test whether unified Republican or Democratic state governments regulate more when constrained by no-carry restrictions. We find no-carry laws restrict partisan fiscal outcomes but tend to lead to more partisan regulatory outcomes.
Introduction
Since the Great Depression, the size of U.S. government has grown consistently. While most focus is traditionally on the expansion of the federal government, Figure 1 As is fitting in a federalist economy, much of the growth in the states concerns local public goods such as education, law and order, social transfers (welfare programs), and health expenditures. Voters pay close attention to these programs since they directly affect their lives. Furthermore, there are significant differences in policy preferences between Republicans and Democrats concerning these budget items -of which both voters and politicians are highly conscious. In general, the consensus view is that Republicans favor smaller government (lower taxes and spending), while Democrats prefer a larger role for government (higher taxes and spending).
These observations raise the question: what role does partisanship play in U.S. state fiscal policy making? When a state has either a unified Republican or Democratic government, are fiscal policies different? Recent research has shown that a lack of political competition may, indeed, have deleterious effects on growth (Besley et al., 2010) . If so, is it possible to reduce these partisan policy outcomes using laws, such as restrictions on the ability to carry a budget deficit into the next fiscal year? Finally, if such laws do effectively constrain partisan fiscal policy choices, do politicians simply appeal to their constituencies through other legislative endeavors, such as regulatory policy? This last point is particularly important since it holds important implications for constitutional design. If we wish to limit government activism using constitutional constraints, then we would like to know if these constraints simply shift activity from one area of government (fiscal policy) to another (regulatory policy). If they do, then it may be more prudent to pursue alternative policies to limit government. We use panel data on U.S. state fiscal and regulatory policies between 1970 and 2010 to answer these questions. We begin by identifying a strong effect of political parties on state policy outcomes. Previous research has found either little effect of unified party control (Gilligan and Matsusaka, 1995; Garand, 1988) or that Democratic control tends to increase taxes and spending (Alt and Lowry, 1994; Reed, 2006) . In particular, Reed (2006) estimates that state government is about three to five percent larger after five years of Democratic control of the legislature. We adopt the basic identification strategy of Reed (2006) , but unlike his study which focuses on just one dependent variable, "Tax Burden" (the ratio of state and local tax revenues to state personal income) our study looks at five state revenue policies and five expenditure policies. What emerges is a more nuanced picture of party activism. We find ample evidence for policy preferences, especially for the Republicans.
When Republicans control both the legislature and governorship, six out of ten fiscal policy variables are significantly affected. We conclude that parties definitely use state fiscal policies to appeal to their voter base.
We next examine whether the partisan policy preferences decrease or even disappear in the presence of laws designed to constrain the size of government. We focus on "no-carry" restrictions, which limit the ability of the government to carry a deficit into the next fiscal year. The literature on the effects of these budget rules is large (see Drazen (2004), and Rose (2006) , for a review). We find that no-carry budget rules do constrain state partisanship. The final stage of our investigation seeks to answer this question by looking at whether politicians engage in offsetting behavior in the presence of binding budget rules. In particular,
we compare the regulatory environment in states with and without no-carry rules, holding constant the amount of unified government. We find that such laws tend to lead to offsetting partisan behavior along the regulatory dimension: when Democrats cannot increase spending, they regulate more and when Republicans cannot cut spending, they regulate less.
Before we present our empirical results, we develop a simple theoretical model of fiscal constraint. We show that if voters view regulatory and fiscal policies as inseparable and if a fiscal constraint binds spending policy to some level between the universal ideal of Republicans and Democrats, then the constraint will result in more-partisan regulatory policies.
Theoretical Model
Public finance scholars have long recognized the inherent substitutability of fiscal and regulatory policy instruments. As Wagner (1989, 108) has put it, "a central principle of public finance is that any statute or regulation can be translated into a budgetary equivalent." In the simple model that follows, we incorporate voter recognition that fiscal and regulatory policy can be substitutes for one another. We then examine the impact of a fiscal policy constraint, such as a strict balanced budget requirement, on both fiscal and regulatory policy platforms.
There are two separate primary elections (Republican and Democratic) with two candidates in each (R 1 , R 2 and D 1 , D 2 ). Each primary candidate adopts a platform in a three-policy space which includes positions on government spending (S), taxation (T ), and regulation (L). Larger numbers of each value represent more activity along that dimension, i.e., more regulation, more taxation, or more spending. Compared with Democrats, Republicans favor lower levels of spending, taxation and regulation.
We define a three-policy vector as P = [S, T, L] . Letting the superscript represent the candidate and the subscript represent the voter, the policy platform of candidate C is
The utility that each voter gets from a candidate's policy platform is a negative function of the distance between the voter's ideal policy vectorP v and the policy platform of the candidate P C :
We assume that this distance takes a weighted Euclidian distance equal to the following:
The parameters α, β and γ are, respectively, the salience terms for spending, taxation, and regulation. By definition they are nonnegative. The parameters δ, λ, and µ are the interaction terms which indicate the voter's conditional preference for one policy based on the value taken by anther policy. If any of these terms equals zero, the value of one policy does not affect the voter's preferences for another and the two issues are said to be separable.
In this case, the indifference curves between the issues will be circular. If, on the other hand, any of these terms takes a value other than zero, then the value of one policy changes the voter's preference for the other issue and the issues are not separable. In this case, the indifference curves between the two issues will be oblong and tilted. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that spending and taxation are separable so that µ = 0.
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Assumption 1: We assume that δ > 0 and λ > 0. This implies negative complementarity between spending and regulation and negative complementarity between taxation and regulation. The idea is that if fiscal and regulatory policy are substitutes for one another, then as the state regulates more, voters will prefer that it tax and spend less. This assumption holds for both Democrats and Republicans.
As a result of Assumption 1 the indifference curves of voters will appear as they do in Figure   2 . The tilted indifference curves indicate conditional preferences. In panels A and B, we see that upon the condition of less-than-ideal taxation and spending, Democrats will prefer a greater level of regulation. And in panels C and D, we see that upon the condition of greater-than-ideal taxation and spending, Republicans will prefer a lower level of regulation.
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The task of candidate C1
his expected vote function where is the probability candidate C1 will win voter v s vote. Following the large literature on probabilistic voting, we assume is a smooth,
The approach was originally developed by Ordeshook (1969, 1971) , but it has seen many refinements. See the overview by Mueller (2003, pp. 249-254) . We have assumed that there are only two candidates in each The task of candidate C 1 seeking his partys nomination in the primary is to maximize his expected vote function EV
v is the probability candidate C 1 will win voter v's vote. Following the large literature on probabilistic voting, we assume π Coughlin and Nitzan (1981a,b) have shown that if individual 2 The approach was originally developed by Hinich et al. (1969 Hinich et al. ( , 1971 but it has seen many refinements. See the overview by Mueller (2003, 249-254) . We have assumed that there are only two candidates in each primary in order to simplify the analysis. Wittman (1984) , however, has shown that equilibrium may be obtained in probabilistic vote models with more than two candidates.
probabilities take the form π
, then an equilibrium will obtain in which primary candidates will adopt platforms at the peak of their party's aggregate expected vote function. Therefore, if individual primary voters are normally distributed about some point
, then the contours of the aggregate expected vote function will follow a pattern similar to the weighted Euclidian distance function of equation 2 above.
Assumption 2: We assume that some institutional constraint such as a "no-carry" requirement pushes taxation up and spending down. Moreover, we assume that taxation is pushed to some level,T , which is more than the ideal taxing level of the median Republican voter, but no greater than the ideal taxing level of the median Democratic voter (T R <T <T D ).
Similarly, spending is pushed to some level,S, which is less than the ideal spending level of the median Democratic voter, but no less than the ideal spending level of the median Republican voter (Ŝ R <S <Ŝ D ). Since the constraint itself is selected by politicians, our intuition is that they will not adopt a constraint which pushes taxation to a level that is more than even high-tax-preferring Democrats want. Nor will they adopt a constraint which pushes spending below what even low-spending Republicans want.
Under the fiscal constraint, each candidate will no longer be able to position herself at the center of the expected vote function. Instead, she will be bound to the lines traced out byS andT in Figure 2 . Each candidate will therefore select a level of regulationL v that minimizes (2), constrained byS andT . As a result, the ideal Republican regulatory policy under the constraintsS andT shifts down toL R , while the ideal Democratic regulatory policy under the constraintsS andT shifts up toL D .
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We can also demonstrate this result mathematically. Let the distance between the voter's ideal spending level,Ŝ v , and the institutional constraint,S v , be σ =Ŝ v −S v . Similarly, let the distance between the voter's ideal tax level,T v , and the institutional constraint,T v , be θ =T v −T v . The "weighted Euclidian distance" functional form under the constraint becomes:
where µ = 0 and the parameters α, β and γ are nonnegative by definition. Assumption 1 implies that δ > 0 and λ > 0 for both parties. Assumption 2 implies that σ > 0 and θ > 0 for Democrats and σ < 0 and θ < 0 for Republicans. Taking the derivative with respect to L C and setting equal to zero, we obtain:
From (4) it is clear that Democratic candidates (for whom σ > 0 and θ > 0) will select a regulatory platform that involves more regulation than otherwise and Republican candidates (for whom σ < 0 and θ < 0) will select a regulatory platform that involves less regulation than otherwise.
In summary, we have two testable predictions. First, in states where Democrats control the legislative process, a fiscal constraint will induce the adoption of relatively more regulation than otherwise. Second, in states where Republicans control the legislative process, a fiscal constraint will induce the adoption of relatively less regulation. In the next sections, we test these two predictions using U.S. state-level data. We first establish that partisan preferences over fiscal policy exist. Then, we exploit the institutional variation across states with regard to constraints on budget deficits to establish that partisan fiscal preferences can be constrained. Finally, we investigate whether unified Democratic or Republican governments in states with binding budget rules pursue more active regulatory policies to offset their inability to affect fiscal policy.
Partisan Fiscal Policy Preferences
We use panel data on U.S. state fiscal policy, economic and demographic conditions, and Bohn and Inman (1996) and Rose (2006), we use the general fund rather than the total budget since it is the principal source of state appropriations and as a result the fund directly constrained by balanced budget requirements.
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We measure partisan control as Democratic and Republican control of both the legislature and governorship, with the omitted category being split control. Previous work by Lowry (1994, 2000) has found that partisan control of both branches of state government is more strongly correlated with fiscal actions than individual control of each branch. Nebraska is excluded from the data since state legislators do not formally affiliate with parties. We also follow convention and exclude Alaska due to its location and resource-dependence.
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We include several variables to control for economic, demographic, fiscal, and political fac-4 The general fund is also the part of the budget legislators have the mose discretion over. The total fund includes insurance trust funds, federal funds, public employee retirement funds, and other special funds; while the general fund does not.
5 See, for example, Shadbegian (1996) , Besley and Case (2003) , and Primo (2007 We examine this change in policy using a difference-in-differences regression. Letting s represent the state and t denote the cycle period, we estimate the following panel regression:
The dependent variable τ st is our fiscal policy measure. Our hypothesis is that β D > 0 and β R < 0 for most revenue and expenditure policies.
The prediction that Democratic governments will raise revenue and taxes to fund higher spending has found support in the work by Alt and Lowry (1994) , Caplan (2001) and Reed (2006) . For the revenue sub-categories, we expect that Republicans will want lower tax rates relative to split control of government, while Democrats will raise tax rates to fund higher expenditures. The one possible exception is that Democrats may prefer lower sales tax rates for their lower income constituents. For expenditure sub-groups, we expect that Democrats prefer higher spending on education and welfare, while Republicans desire lower spending on these categories. We also expect that Republicans want higher spending on law & order and capital, while Democrats want to lower spending on these items.
9 Table 2 presents the estimation results of (5) Table 2 : Equation (5) is estimated with the fiscal policy listed on top as the dependent variable. The coefficient for Unified party p is β p . The coefficients for the intercept term, control variables and time dummies are not shown. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. '***', '**' and '*' indicate significance at the one, five and ten percent levels, respectively.
Crain (2003), and Primo (2007) . They all generally find that fiscal rules lead to lower deficits and less spending. Bohn and Inman (1996) test the effectiveness of a wide variety of rules with different requirements and enforcement characteristics and find that no-carry provisions are the most effective in generating large general fund surpluses. Since one of our primary interests is the potential offsetting behavior of fiscal constraints rather than the effectiveness of a broad range of rules we follow Rose (2006) in focusing on no-carry rules. No-carry rules combine what Bohn and Inman refer to as "proscriptive" rules on the size of the budget, with more stringent "retrospective" rules that prevent a state from "carrying" a deficit into the next fiscal year. At present, twenty-eight states have no-carry rules. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the no-carry and carry-over states. As the map makes clear, there are no obvious patterns in which states have adopted these fiscal restrictions. Rose (2006) argues that these, and most other balanced-budget requirements, are exogenous since their adoption was largely based on historical accident. Indeed, with the exception of Tennessee who adopted their rules in 1977, most states adopted their no-carry restrictions in their original constitutions (Savage, 1990 ).
We identify the constraining effect of no-carry restrictions on partisan governments by adding interaction terms to specification (5). The resulting equation becomes:
where N oCarry s is a dummy variable that is one if a state has a no-carry restriction on its budget and zero if a state has the ability to carry-over its deficit. 10 The marginal effect of a unified Democratic or Republican government on policy in (6) is ∂τ ∂P oliticalP arty p = β p + φ p × N oCarry
Where p indexes the party of interest (Democrat or Republican). Using (7), one can see that the marginal effect of a unified government under carry-over provisions is β p , while the marginal effect of a unified government under no-carry restrictions is β p + φ p . Brambor and Golder (2006) show that the calculation of both β p and β p + φ p ; and their standard errors (rather than individually reporting β p and φ p ) is necessary to convey the quantities of interest.
Our particular interest is to see if no-carry restrictions constrain partisan fiscal policy. We do so in a series of tests. First, we test if no-carry restrictions reduce partisan fiscal policy.
Given that we expect β D > 0 and β R < 0 for both taxing and spending policies, we test partisan fiscal policy. For revenue policies in Table 3 , Republican tax-cutting policies are reduced, but not eliminated by the no-carry restrictions. In particular, the marginal effect of Republican tax cutting are higher (in absolute terms) under carry-over than under no-Carry, but the marginal effects under no-carry are still negative and significant. Democrats, on the other hand, are more likely to raise revenue and taxes in general and individual income taxes in specific under the no-carry rules. However, both Republican and Democratic partisan expenditure preferences are effectively eliminated in Table 4 . In each expenditure policy, the marginal effects of each political party under no-carry restrictions are insignificant although some were significant under no-carry provisions and in Table 3 .
( 1 ) Table 4 : Partisan and No-Carry Impact on Expenditure Policies. Equation (6) is estimated with the fiscal policy listed on top as the dependent variable. The coefficient for Unified party p under Carry-over is β p and the coefficient for Unified party p under No-Carry is β p + φ p . The Unified Democratic Test is the p-value of a one-tailed test that H 0 : β D + φ D > 0 and the Unified Republican Test is the p-value of a one-tailed test that H 0 : β R + φ R < 0. The coefficients for the intercept term, control variables and time dummies are not shown. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. '***', '**' and '*' indicate significance at the one, five and ten percent levels respectively.
Partisan Regulatory Policies
The final question we ask is whether constraining politicians from pursuing partisan fiscal policies causes them to shift their behavior towards more partisan regulatory outcomes. The empirical literature is relatively mute on this question. Nonetheless, most theories of regulation assume that the electorate plays at least some role in pressuring politicians to adopt regulations that conform to their preferences (see, for example, Stigler, 1971; Yandle, 1983; Becker, 1983) . Our reasoning is that politicians have only a limited menu of policy instruments with which to convince voters that they are acting in their interests. One important subset of these instruments is fiscal policy. However, there are plenty of other margins politicians can manipulate to get reelected, such as regulatory policy. Our question boils down to whether -as in the theoretical section above -political actors view regulatory and fiscal policy as substitutable means to achieve public policy goals. To the extent that we clearly identify partisan policy preferences and the effect of no-carry restrictions in constraining fiscal outcomes in the first two sections above, we have a ready-made identification strategy for answering this query.
We investigate the impact of state partisanship on individual regulatory policies. We focus on those policies that are quantifiable, legislated by state government, immune from extensive judicial interpretation, and clearly partisan. We identify four individual labor laws and two individual social laws that meet these criteria. states is rejected at the ten percent level.
We estimate the effects of partisanship on regulation in (8) and the possible enhancing effect of no-carry restrictions on regulation in (9):
The regulation variable r st is dichotomous with the exception of the Minimum Wage. Since these dichotomous variables change at most once, state fixed effects cannot be included.
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Otherwise, the right-hand side variables in (8) and (9) are the same as in specifications (5) and (6). The marginal effects in (9) are the same as before with the effect of a unified government under carry-over provisions equal to β p and the effect of a unified government under no-carry restrictions equal to β p + φ p .
What is different is our hypothesis on the relationship of these marginal effects in (9).
Our election model in section II predicts that state governments constrained by fiscal rules 12 We do however include a set of regional dummy variables.
will substitute out of fiscal policy and into regulatory policy to meet voter preferences.
Therefore, we expect that Democratic state governments under no-carry restrictions to add more regulation than Democrats under carry-over provisions
we expect that Republican state governments under no-carry restrictions to reduce more regulation than Republicans without those restrictions H 0 : β R + φ R < 0. We test each hypothesis using a one-tailed test. Table 6 : Partisan Impacts on Individual Regulations. Equation (8) is estimated with the regulatory policy listed on top as the dependent variable using the estimator indicated. The coefficient for Unified party p is β p . The coefficients for the intercept term, control variables and time dummies are not shown. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. '***', '**' and '*' indicate significance at the one, five and ten percent levels respectively.
fiscal rules (their support for a closed union shop is strong under both no-carry and carry-over provisions). In contrast, Republican state governments oppose closed union shops, explicit minimum meal periods and age gap provisions when constrained by fiscal rules.
Conclusion
We begin by presenting a simple theoretical model in which voters view fiscal and regulatory instruments as substitutable means to achieving the ends of government policy. We show that, in the presence of a fiscal constraint that binds the parties to fiscal policies that are different than those they prefer, the parties adopt more partisan regulatory positions.
Democrats adopt platforms that call for more regulation while Republicans adopt platforms that call for less regulation.
We then run a series of statistical tests to examine the validity of this story. In the first set of Table 7 : Partisan and No-Carry Impact on Individual Regulations. Equation (9) is estimated with the regulatory policy listed on top as the dependent variable using the estimator indicated. The coefficient for Unified party p under Carry-over is β p and the coefficient for Unified party p under No-Carry is β p + φ p . The Unified Democratic Test is the p-value of a one-tailed test that H 0 : β D + φ D > 0 and the Unified Republican Test is the p-value of a one-tailed test that H 0 : β R + φ R < 0. The coefficients for the intercept term, control variables and time dummies are not shown. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. '***', '**' and '*' indicate significance at the one, five and ten percent levels respectively.
tests, we find strong support for partisan policy preferences. We contribute to the literature that studies the role of political parties in government by looking at a broader range of policies than previous studies. This allows us to confirm that parties do indeed matter for fiscal policy. We find that Republicans do generally support budgets that decrease the size of government, whereas Democrats favor higher taxes and spending. Furthermore, to the extent that unified Republican governments appear to be elected in states with higher spending and taxes and vice versa for Democrats, voters expect the parties to purse these policies.
Our second contribution is to show that no-carry restrictions do constrain partisan policy preferences. This is consistent with previous literature, though we contribute to the literature by showing this for a broader set of policies than previous researchers.
Our most intriguing result is that politicians in those states bound by fiscal policy rules will instead substitute into regulatory efforts. We show that Democrats will pursue a higher minimum wage, explicit minimum rest periods and no fault divorce legislation. By contrast,
Republicans who are constrained from pursuing their preferred set of fiscal policies tend to oppose closed union shops, explicit minimum meal periods and age gap provisions more than their unconstrained colleagues.
Our results suggest political actors use whatever policy instruments are available to them to achieve their ends. If they are constrained along one dimension, they substitute into morepartisan activities along the other dimension. If there is one over-arching message to our findings, it is that voters "get what they ask for," and this holds true even if they attempt to bind themselves using constitutional rules. Politicians will find a way to play politics, often in unintended ways.
